Bayern Munich’s 3-0 defeat to Bayer Leverkusen signaled a momentous shift in the Bundesliga. If the Rekordmeister still had an aura of invincibility amid Xabi Alonso’s remarkable Leverkusen run this season, it was thoroughly shattered.
Today we will break down the highlights — or rather lowlights — to see how Xabi and Bayern coach Thomas Tuchel approached the game. And how Leverkusen managed to have Bayern’s number.
Bayern build-up through wide center-backs
Bayern started the game without the services of Joshua Kimmich, their maestro in midfield. Thomas Tuchel opted to shift the central ball-playing role to an extra center-back instead in Eric Dier.
Build-up rotated instead through the wide center-backs, Kim Min-jae and Dayot Upamecano (shifting mainly to Upamecano’s side after the first goal). Though tasked with the responsibility, the wide center-backs proved not the best link-up technicians.
Here Upamecano receives and drives forward, only to feed his next pass – a lay-off inside to Harry Kane – straight at a Leverkusen defender:
That the plan did not work did not stop Bayern from try, trying again. Fruitlessly down the wing on one side, then back to the center, then out to the other wing – always through the wide center-backs:
All of these moments resulted in turnovers, several of them from misplaced passes by Kim or Upamecano. It is not hard to see why. With ponderous circulation, Leverkusen had ample time to congest the passing lanes. Bayern was left free to do simple passing exercises until they tried to actually do anything.
The ball-playing abilities of Kim and Upamecano were muted by placing them always in motion. Upamecano can sit deep, scan the field, and ping the ball — but not when he is driving forward. Here he misses the chance to launch one at Leroy Sané, who has found an excellent opportunity to beat the last line:
Because Upamecano is dribbling at the Leverkusen lines, he has already committed to the simple, safe action: stopping out of range of any challenges and shuttling the ball out wide to the nearby unmarked wing-back.
Shuttling out wide, playing it back, and circulating patiently: where was an incisive attack going to materialize out of that? Maybe in moments of individual magic, as seen below:
Jamal Musiala has made a great run in behind, and if he can dance through a few defenders, he might be able to manage a wonder goal from a tight angle — considering he has no help arriving at all. Current Manchester City and former Bayern coach Pep Guardiola constructs team goals, tap ins, and there is wisdom in that — not relying on the extraordinary.
In any case, Musiala did not have the chance. The vertical pass — which came from Kim — was weighted too heavy and out of his reach.
Bayern struggled to unleash their flair players
Bayern’s insistence on progressing out wide rather than centrally looks like tactical instructions that were followed rather than ignored. Despite the central presence of three creative forces in attack — Musiala, Sané, and Harry Kane — Bayern failed to find and feature them regularly.
Here Sané drops into a developing pocket of space – Jamal Musiala is offering short, marked by Robert Andrich (#8); Granit Xhaka (#34) is marking Kane – but Upamecano passes short up the line.
Sané has been Bayern’s danger man all season. His deftness at carving a swathe through the center of the field at pace is key to situations such as this, where Leverkusen’s players are pulled towards one sideline. But it looked like the plan was to progress vertically up the sideline — and it was poorly executed, to boot. Upamecano’s short pass simply strays out of bounds.
Here, again, Upamecano on the ball cycles it out to the wing-back, rather than try to draw in markers and play through the lines to one of Sané, Musiala, or Goretzka.
Credit must be given to Leverkusen: this is how they drew it up. Die Werkself were always ready to swarm Bayern’s pivot players on receipt of pass, while conceding the backline circulation and begging Bayern to pick the safest option — safe, from both team’s perspectives. And the Bavarians gladly, repeatedly obliged.
Bayern was better in chaotic transitional moments, where instinct trumped design. The best attack of the first half came after wing-back Noussair Mazraoui won the ball pressing high. The play flowed through Musiala to Sané – who drew defenders to himself and then found Goretzka’s late run into the final third:
Goretzka skies the shot but there was nothing wrong here in the construction.
As BFW staff writer RLD noted in his terrific post-game analysis, Bayern’s pressing intent was key to its gameplan and it is a credit to Leverkusen — disciplined and inch-perfect on the day — for withstanding the barrage.
In possession, though, Bayern more often than not struggled to develop real threats.
Here Sané is floating in between the lines — although closely watched by Piero Hincapié (#3) — and Upamecano, driving forward, releases his pass at the wrong moment.
Sané is corralled as the ball arrives and is forced to pass back to Aleksandar Pavlović. The youngster, starting in place of Joshua Kimmich, had a poor outing overall. He did not seem aware of Goretzka arriving off his back shoulder into a threatening central pocket of space, and seemed locked into cycling the ball back safely into defense.
Though that, too, may have been the tactical instruction.
Undone by unfamiliarity
Coincidence or not, Bayern’s formation change came with a litany of communication and positional discipline errors. Leverkusen, as noted, also changed but executed well.
Here, as he receives a back pass, Neuer fans his arms wide to signal what he wants from his back line before blasting a no-look pass out to his left. However, Kim – a center-back where a full-back might have usually been – is coming inside and the pass lasers out of bounds:
Kim must have had a frustrating day. On both of Leverkusen’s first two goals he identified a threat and issued instructions which were ignored – first to Sacha Boey to watch Josip Stanišić on the wing, later to Pavlović to watch for the give-and-go back to Álex Grimaldo. Stanišić and Grimaldo scored the goals.
Boey, the recently-signed right-back, looked lost at times at left wing-back. Minutes after falling asleep on the first goal, here he is drawn towards the ball as he tracks back – losing the winger, Nathan Tella, making the bombing run forward:
The result: Boey is a mile behind Tella as Hincapié finds the switch, resulting in two clean chances on goal.
Bayern’s midfield also seemed to feel more security in the back three behind them than they should have, and were often pinched forward. Leverkusen took advantage to gain space centrally. Here Goretzka is caught drifting towards the ball, leaving no coverage in the No. 6 area and a wide lane for Andrich to drive through.
Bayern’s continual concentration lapses were staggering.
Having already contributed to the first two goals, here Bayern players again are outdone in transition. Mazraoui has delivered a poor pass towards Upamecano up in the attacking right wing. While Goretzka and Sané throw their arms up — at a teammate or perhaps the referee — Leverkusen springs into action as a unit:
Once again, the Bayern second level is bypassed and it’s a gaggle of Leverkusen forwards shooting the gaps between the Bayern back line. An opposing coach once said of Julian Nagelsmann’s Bayern last season: arrows down all sides.
Compare the two stills. In the first, Leverkusen has not yet collected the ball and has only four players to Bayern’s six in the attacking half of the field. Four seconds later, a Leverkusen midfielder is driving forward with a slight numerical advantage.
Bayern ends up lucky that Robert Andrich is not the play-maker that Florian Wirtz is.
Xabi Alonso’s triumphant moment
In sum Bayern did not have a compelling plan of attack and Leverkusen was fully prepared for what Bayern would try to throw at them. A credit to Leverkusen coach Xabi Alonso, who was the better coach on the day — and by some margin.
Die Werkself enforced Bayern’s build-up through the wide center-backs by hounding the pivots with an aggressive press and daring the Bavarians to try for technical flair in risky central areas:
And they crowded out the wide areas by the time Bayern picked one to play through:
Bayern’s preference for recycling was so strong, regardless of field situation, and Leverkusen had it all sniffed out. Here is Wirtz jumping the lane behind Pavlović, knowing the Bayern midfielder will hit it first time back towards Upamecano rather than turn upfield and look for options there:
While in their own build out, Leverkusen found the vertical progressions and made use of the switches opened up by drawing all of Bayern’s players to one side of the field. This is the lead up to the second goal:
And where Bayern lacked discipline, Leverkusen stayed on point. Here is a moment where Dier tries tricky, motioning to Pavlović to shift to the side. Rather than following, Granit Xhaka stays put and intercepts the lines-breaking pass Dier attempts for Sané.
Focused where Bayern was lax, brave where Bayern was patient. Leverkusen executed as a team while Bayern relied on individual magic. The result? Bayern was thoroughly out-classed, out-hustled, out-coached, and out-executed.
How Bayern could have played differently
It is fair to ask how much of this failure comes down to the approach, and how much down to execution. The defeat was comprehensive, after all.
But comparing Tuchel to Bayern’s last coach, we can see contrasts in style. While Julian Nagelsmann also favored stable, probing circulation in build-up — a 3+1 base operated by his preferred No. 6, Joshua Kimmich — the former Bayern coach and minimum-width disciple liked to work in the half-spaces. Risky? Maybe. The Nagelsmann principle was if you lose the ball centrally while narrow, you can clamp down just as fast to win the ball back.
Without Kimmich available (though that was potentially a coach’s decision), Nagelsmann might have opted for dropping Jamal Musiala as the deep playmaker in midfield, as he did two seasons ago — with Thomas Müller on for the second midfielder and an extra winger, Mathys Tel, in place of the third center-back, to offer a switch-of-play option (a role that in this game, was executed poorly by left wing-back Boey). Müller, Sané, Kane, and Musiala would then rotate as half-space creators while either full-back takes turns in the back line.
Müller represents a directness of attacking of intent that seems almost anathema to Tuchel ball. But his on-field leadership is invaluable, and so too is his interpretation of the half-spaces.
A difference in approach is no guarantee of success. Xabi and Leverkusen are flying high and deserved the victory fully on their own merits. Nonetheless, the Bayern coach of today and the Bayern coach of one year ago likely would have had contrasting approaches to this matchup.
Who will the Bayern coach of tomorrow be, and how will they evolve the squad?
In closing
It has been a long time since a Bundesliga team forced this kind of reckoning upon the Bavarians. Credit to Xabi Alonso and Bayer Leverkusen. And maybe, just maybe, Bayern will emerge stronger for the challenge.
Looking for a more in-depth review of the game, or do you just want to wallow in our misery? Then check out our postgame podcast! Chuck and INNN talk about Tuchel’s shortcomings and why Bayern Munich were outclassed by Bayer Leverkusen. Listen to it below or on Spotify.
Where does Bayern Munich go from here? Let’s discuss it on the Bavarian Podcast Works Show on Spotify or below:
As always, we appreciate all the support!